Public investment and corruption in an endogenous growth model by Tarhan, Simge
MPRA
Munich Personal RePEc Archive
Public investment and corruption in an
endogenous growth model
Simge Tarhan
University of Minnesota, Colby College
1. November 2008
Online at https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/27274/
MPRA Paper No. 27274, posted 7. December 2010 20:26 UTC
Public Investment and Corruption
in an Endogenous Growth Model∗
Simge Tarhan†
Abstract
High capital spending is favored by economists and politicians for its beneficial effects on
economic growth. However, there is empirical research associating high levels of public in-
vestment with low economic growth due to corruption. I provide an endogenous growth
model with Ramsey taxation that is consistent with this empirical finding. In the model,
government maximizes the weighted average of consumers’ utility and its own utility coming
from expropriation of tax revenues. The weight determines the benevolence of the govern-
ment. I show that a self-interested government sets a higher public-to-private-capital ratio
than a benevolent one, reducing the productivity of public capital, in order to use more of the
tax revenues for its own consumption. While a large public-to-private capital ratio increases
the productivity of private investment, high taxes that come along with high public capital
spending reduce the after-tax returns to private investment, causing the growth rate to be
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1 Introduction
This paper studies the relationship between political corruption and public investment,
and how economic growth in the long run is affected by this relationship. Political corruption,
as defined by Transparency International, is the abuse of entrusted power by political leaders
for private gain, with the objective of increasing power or wealth. Given this definition, a
benevolent government, whose sole purpose is to promote consumers’ welfare, would never
engage in corrupt activities. Hence, it is important to relax the assumption of a benevolent
government in order to understand the link between political corruption, public investment,
and growth. To this end, I write an endogenous growth model with a non-benevolent gov-
ernment, which decides how much public investment to undertake. In the model I assume
public investment to be financed through income taxes. Collecting taxes and deciding how
to use the tax revenues give the government an opportunity to engage in corrupt activities
for its own benefit. Using the model, I study the choices of the government and the behavior
of consumers as a response to government policies, all depending on how benevolent the
government is.
In the model the government is assumed to maximize a weighted average of consumers’
welfare and its own welfare coming from expropriated tax revenues. The weight on con-
sumers’ welfare determines how benevolent the government is. If the weight on consumers’
welfare is zero, then the government is totally self-interested, and if the weight is one then
the government is totally benevolent. The weight can be any number between 0 and 1,
implying that the government can be partially benevolent. I show when the government is
self-interested, the amount of productive public investment is low but the amount of expro-
priated tax revenues is high.
The government is assumed to be constrained by a period-by-period budget, which implies
an upper bound on total embezzlement by the government in any period. This results in a
dilemma for the corrupt politicians: they can either steal as much as they can in any period,
leaving only a small amount of funds for the financing of the public capital, or they can invest
in public capital so as to increase the productivity of private capital, and hence income, in
the future. Increased income implies higher income tax revenues and more funds to embezzle
in the future. Therefore, each type of government chooses an optimal growth rate through
its policies that balances the cost of deferring expropriation of funds today and the benefit
of increased tax revenues that can be embezzled in the future. This optimal growth rate is
determined by the public-to-private capital ratio. I argue that a self-interested government
chooses a higher public-to-private-capital ratio than a benevolent government and that this
results in lower economic growth in the long run.
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Some implications of the model can be tested against the data. This exercise requires cer-
tain parameters and variables of the model to be interpreted in a way that allows comparison
with observed and recorded data. For example, the degree of benevolence of the government
in the model is interpreted as the degree of the lack of corruption in that country. Hence,
a self-interested government in the model corresponds to a highly corrupt government in
the data. A similar re-interpretation is also needed for public investment. While the model
distinguishes between productive public investment and expropriated tax revenues, it is hard
to do so in the data. Expropriated tax revenues are recorded as part of government budget
and affect several entries in the government budget. However, authors such as Tanzi and
Davoodi (1997) and Keefer and Knack (2007) claim that most of the corrupt activities of
governments are recorded as public investment1. In accordance with these studies, expro-
priated tax revenues will be treated as part of public investment and the model will predict
high levels of total public investment in countries with high corruption. This prediction is
consistent with the aforementioned papers.
To the best of my knowledge, this paper is the first attempt to explain the interrelation-
ship between political corruption, public investment, and economic growth through a model
that analyzes the behavior of different types of government. Haque and Kneller (2008) un-
dertake an empirical study to see the effects of corruption on public investment and economic
growth. They find that corruption raises the level of public investment but lowers the re-
turns to it, making it ineffective in promoting economic growth, which is consistent with the
results of my model.
1.1 Background and Related Literature
The effect of public investment on growth has been debated extensively in the literature.
Starting with Barro (1990), many researchers have tried to capture the effect of public in-
vestment on growth; however, a consensus on the empirical evidence has never been reached.
There are studies claiming that public investment is not important for economic growth (e.g.
Easterly and Rebelo (1993)) while others maintain that public investment has a substantial
positive effect on growth (e.g. Aschauer (1989)). There are yet other papers which assert
that only certain types of public investment are productive and that the effect of these on
growth are different from the effect of non-productive public investment. For example, De-
varajan, Swaroop, and Zou (1996) find that current expenditure has a positive effect on
economic growth whereas capital spending of governments has a negative relationship on
growth. They argue that developing countries have over-invested in public capital at the
1See next section for a more detailed discussion.
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expense of current spending.
The link between corruption and public investment has been explored mainly empirically.
Tanzi and Davoodi (1997), for example, maintain that corrupt governments choose a higher
public investment share of aggregate income. They claim that political corruption is often
tied to capital projects. This is because the decisions regarding the budget and composition
of capital are highly discretionary. Lack of competition in undertaking big capital projects
and the difficulty in assessing the real cost and value of these projects make them a tool
for corruption. The authors also argue that corruption reduces the productivity of public
capital. Similarly, Keefer and Knack (2007) show observed levels of public investment, as
fractions of national income or of total investment, to be higher in corrupt countries. These
empirical findings are consistent with what my model predicts.
There have been many empirical studies trying to document a relationship between cor-
ruption and economic growth, especially after the well-known paper of Mauro (1995). Mauro
(1995) maintains that corruption leads to lower economic growth and there are several stud-
ies confirming this paper’s findings. (e.g. Tanzi and Davoodi (1997), Mauro (1997)) My
results are consistent with these papers; high corruption and low growth go hand in hand.
1.2 Contribution of This Paper
This paper contributes to the literature on public investment and growth, corruption and
growth, and corruption and public investment. Most of the work done in these areas are
empirical and lack a theoretical basis. However, in order to fully understand the economic
mechanism tying these variables and provide policy suggestions, it is important to have a
model that captures the way benevolent and self-interested governments act. This paper
provides such a model and therefore fills a theoretical gap in the literature. Within an
optimal fiscal policy framework this paper explains the interdependency of public investment,
corruption and growth.
This paper also contributes to the literature on optimal fiscal policy with linear taxes.
Most of the previous work in this literature assumes government to be benevolent.2 Jones,
Manuelli, and Rossi (1993) extend the basic literature to endogenous growth models and
Azzimonti-Renzo, Sarte, and Soares (2003) consider optimal choices of government in an en-
vironment with public capital. Contrary to these works, this paper allows the government to
be self-interested and compares the behavior of self-interested and benevolent governments.
2See Devereux and Wen (1998) and Woo (2003) for models with non-benevolent governments.
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1.3 The Road Map
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: In Section 2, the model setup is introduced
and competitive equilibrium is defined. Competitive equilibrium outcomes are for given gov-
ernment policies; however, the aim of this paper is to endogenize government policies. For
this reason, another equilibrium concept, namely Ramsey equilibrium, is employed. Ramsey
equilibrium outcomes include policy selections by the government and private allocations as
best response to government policies. Competitive equilibrium outcomes are used to charac-
terize Ramsey equilibrium, following Chari and Kehoe (1999). Next, balanced growth path
allocations are characterized. These allocations depend on the type of the government, hence
the relationship between public investment, corruption, and long-run growth can be studied.
In Section 3, some empirical implications of the model are explained. These implications are
consistent with previous empirical work described in the literature review above. However,
not all empirical implications of the model have been studied before. Therefore I use the
data set from Easterly and Rebelo (1993) to compare the results of the model with the data.
In section 4, I describe the data I use and show that those implications of the model are also
consistent with the data. Section 5 concludes.
2 The model
2.1 Setup
In order to study the relationship between public investment and growth, an endogenous
growth model with public capital is used. In this economy, there are a continuum of identical
infinitely-lived individuals and a government. Each individual is born with an initial capital
endowment of k0. To keep the model simple, it is assumed that there is no labor market.
There is a single nonstorable consumption good which is valued by the consumers. The
representative individual maximizes her present discounted utility from consumption, where
the discount rate β ∈ (0, 1):
∞∑
t=0
βtu(ct) (1)
Individuals rent capital, k, to firms and earn capital income at rate r, and pay income
taxes at rate τ to the government. Therefore, their budget constraint is:
ct + kt+1 − (1− δk)kt = (1− τt)rtkt ∀t (2)
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where δk is the depreciation rate for private capital. Hence, given the representative
individual’s initial capital endowment, k0, the sequence of rates of return to private capital,
{rt}∞0 , and the sequence of tax rates, {τt}∞0 , the representative consumer’s problem can be
written as:
Consumer’s Problem
max
ct,kt+1
∞∑
t=0
βtu(ct)
subject to
ct + kt+1 − (1− δk)kt = (1− τt)rtkt ∀t
ct ≥ 0, kt+1 ≥ 0 ∀t
There are two factors of production in this economy: private capital and public capital.
Each firm produces output, yt, according to the following technology:
yt = f(kt, gt) = Akt(
gt
Kt
)α ∀t (3)
where A > 0, 0 < α < 1, gt is the public capital stock, and Kt is the aggregate private
capital stock. Individual private capital stock k and aggregate private capital stock K are
differentiated to capture the effect of congestion on the marginal productivity of private
capital. As the aggregate capital stock increases, public capital available per unit of private
capital decreases, thereby reducing the marginal productivity of private capital. As argued
in Barro and Sala-i Martin (1992), this functional form of production function refers to the
case when public goods are rival but not excludable. According to these authors this type
of public goods includes highways, water and sewer systems, airports and harbors, courts,
and even national defense and police.
Note that this production function implies constant returns to private capital as long as
the government maintains a constant congestion of public services, i.e. a constant g
K
ratio.
However, the aggregate production function Yt = AKt(
gt
Kt
)α exhibits diminishing returns to
aggregate private capital K for given public capital stock g, and this is due to congestion.
This environment is similar to the one in Barro (1990) except that in the production
function public services appear as stock variable, whereas in Barro (1990) they are treated
as flow variable. Also, public services are assumed to be subject to congestion in this setup.
The government is allowed to be non-benevolent and is assumed to maximize a weighted
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average of consumers’ welfare and the utility it gets from expropriated resources:
∞∑
t=0
βt{(1− θ)u(Ct) + θv(Et)} (4)
where θ ∈ [0, 1] is the type of the government and E is the expropriation by the government.
Here θ denotes the degree of government’s benevolence. If θ = 0, the government is
totally benevolent and maximizes consumers’ utility. If θ = 1, the government is totally self-
interested and maximizes the amount of resources it can divert from productive uses. The
parameter θ is allowed to take on any value between 0 and 1, implying that the government
can be partially benevolent. The type of the government is determined exogenously and
does not change over time.
The degree of benevolence of a government can depend on many institutional, sociological,
historical, and economic factors. Studying these factors is outside the scope of this paper,
and hence, the type of the government will be treated as exogenously given. Moreover,
indices measuring the extent of corruption show that there is persistence in the extent of
corruption over time3. Corrupt countries tend to stay corrupt. Similarly, clean economies
persistently stay free of corruption4. Hence, θ for any country will be taken as constant over
time.
The government levies distortionary income taxes to finance public investment but it can
expropriate part of the tax revenues for its own consumption. Hence, the government budget
constraint at any time t can be written as:
Et + gt+1 − (1− δg)gt = τtrtKt (5)
where E is the amount of expropriation and δg is the depreciation rate of public capital. It is
assumed that the government has a technology that converts tax revenues into public good.
Also, it is assumed that gt+1 ≥ 0 in every period. This implies that the maximum amount
that can be expropriated at any time t equals total tax revenues at that period plus existing
public capital net of depreciation.
A government policy is a sequence of tax rates, public capital levels, and amount of
expropriation for all t ≥ 0. It is denoted by Π = {τt, gt+1, Et}∞t=0.
3For example, Corruption Perceptions Index values in 1995 and 2006 have a correlation coefficient equal
to 0.93. See Appendix B for details.
4See Mauro (2004) for two models with multiple equilibria that explain the persistence phenomena and
its effects on economic growth.
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Finally, feasible allocations are described by the resource constraint:
Ct +Kt+1 − (1− δk)Kt + gt+1 − (1− δg)gt + Et = AKt
(
gt
Kt
)α
(6)
where C is the aggregate consumption in the economy.
2.2 Competitive Equilibrium
Competitive equilibrium describes the choices of consumers and firms as best response
to government policies. Private agents’ optimal choices along with the feasibility constraint
and the government budget constraint are used to characterize the competitive equilibrium
allocations and prices.
Definition 1 (Competitive Equilibrium) For a given government policy Π =
{τt, gt+1, Et}t≥0, and initial public and private capital stocks, g0 and k0, a competitive equi-
librium for this economy is an allocation {ct, kt+1, Ct, Kt+1}t≥0, and a price {rt}t≥0 such
that:
1. Given prices and policy, the allocation solves the Consumer’s Problem.
2. Price satisfies rt = fkt = A(
gt
Kt
)α, ∀t.
3. Government budget constraint (5) holds.
4. Resource constraint (6) is satisfied.
2.2.1 Characterizing Competitive Equilibrium
Let λt be the Lagrange multiplier on the time-t consumer’s budget constraint (denoted
Cons-BC below). The following equations, including first-order conditions for the consumer’s
problem and budget constraints, characterize the competitive equilibrium:
Cons-BC: Ct +Kt+1 − (1− δk)Kt = (1− τt)rtKt ∀t
Cons-FOC1: βu
′(ct+1)
u′(ct) =
λt+1
λt
∀t
Cons-FOC2: λt+1[(1− τt+1)rt+1 + 1− δk] = λt ∀t
Price: rt = A
(
gt
Kt
)α
∀t
GBC: Et + gt+1 − (1− δg)gt = τtrtKt ∀t
Feasibility: Ct +Kt+1 − (1− δk)Kt + gt+1 − (1− δg)gt + Et = AKt
(
gt
Kt
)α
∀t
TVC1: limt→∞ λtKt = 0
TVC2: limt→∞ λtgt = 0
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The following two propositions simplify the characterization of competitive equilibrium
by reducing it down to two equations. These propositions will be used in the next section
to describe Ramsey equilibrium allocations.
Proposition 1 The allocations in a competitive equilibrium satisfy the following:
Ct +Kt+1 − (1− δk)Kt + gt+1 − (1− δg)gt + Et = AKt
(
gt
Kt
)α
(7)
u′(Ct) = βu′(Ct+1)[
Ct+1 +Kt+2
Kt+1
] (8)
Proof. Constraint (7) is part of the definition of competitive equilibrium. (8) is obtained
by plugging GBC, Price, and Feasibility in Cons-FOC. See Appendix A for details.
Equation (8) is called the implementability constraint because it describes the conditions
government policies can be implemented, given the best response of consumers and firms to
government’s choices.
Proposition 2 Given allocations and period-0 policies that satisfy (7) and (8), one can
construct policies and prices which, together with the given allocations and period-0 policies,
constitute a competitive equilibrium.
Proof. See Appendix A.
2.3 Ramsey Equilibrium
Competitive equilibrium allocations describe the behavior of private agents given gov-
ernment policy. To analyze the policy selection behavior of the government, the setup of the
model will be reinterpreted as a game and additional assumptions regarding the timing of
the game will be made. It will be assumed that the government moves first at time 0 and
sets the stream of future policies for all time t ≥ 0. Consumers make their decisions after
they observe the government policy. This timing assumption implies that the government
can fully commit to its policies at the beginning of the game and cannot change its actions
after consumers have made their savings decisions. The equilibrium notion used in this case
is called Ramsey equilibrium.
Definition 2 (Ramsey Equilibrium) Given initial capital stocks, g0 and K0, a Ram-
sey equilibrium is a government policy Π = {τt, gt+1, Et}t≥0, an allocation rule
{Ct(·), Kt+1(·)}t≥0, and a price function {rt(·)}t≥0 such that:
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1. Government policy Π solves:
max
Π
∞∑
t=0
βt{(1− θ)u(Ct(pi′)) + θv(Et)}
subject to
Et + gt+1 − (1− δg)gt = τtrt(pi′)Kt(pi′)
2. For every policy pi′ ∈ Π, the allocations C(pi′) and K(pi′), and the price system r(pi′)
constitute a competitive equilibrium.
The resulting allocations in Ramsey equilibrium are called Ramsey allocations and the
resulting policies are called Ramsey policies. Propositions 1 and 2 will be used to characterize
the Ramsey equilibrium.
2.3.1 Characterizing Ramsey Equilibrium
Ramsey Problem, maximizing the government’s objective function subject to the
feasibility and implementability constraints, will be used to characterize the Ramsey
Equilibrium, following Chari and Kehoe (1999). Proposition 3 extends the results of Chari
and Kehoe (1999) to the case with non-benevolent governments.
Ramsey Problem with Non-Benevolent Government:
max
Ct,Kt+1,Et,gt+1
∞∑
t=0
βt{(1− θ)u(Ct) + θv(Et)}
subject to
Ct +Kt+1 − (1− δk)Kt + gt+1 − (1− δg)gt + Et = AKt
(
gt
Kt
)α
(9)
u′(Ct) = βu′(Ct+1)[
Ct+1 +Kt+2
Kt+1
] (10)
Proposition 3 Ramsey allocations and policies solve the Ramsey Problem with Non-
Benevolent Government.
Proof. This is a corollary of Propositions 1 and 2.
Let βtλt and β
tµt be the Lagrange multipliers on (11) and (12), respectively. Then the
following equations, which include first-order conditions and the constraints of the problem,
characterize the Ramsey Equilibrium:
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(1− θ)u′t + λt + µtu′′t − µt−1u′′t [Ct+Kt+1Kt ]− µt−1u′t 1Kt = 0
λt − βλt+1[1− δk + A(1− α)
(
gt+1
Kt+1
)α
] + βµtu
′
t+1[
Ct+1+Kt+2
K2t+1
]− µt−1 u
′
t
Kt
= 0
θv′t + λt = 0
λt − βλt+1[1− δg + Aα
(
gt+1
Kt+1
)α−1
] = 0
Ct +Kt+1 − (1− δk)Kt + gt+1 − (1− δg)gt + Et = AKt
(
gt
Kt
)α
βu′(Ct+1)[
Ct+1+Kt+2
Kt+1
] = u′(Ct)
These equations describe the optimal behavior of the government and consumers at all
time periods.
2.4 Balanced Growth Path
The main focus of the paper is long-run growth, so the balanced growth path will be
analyzed5. On a balanced growth path, the following ratios must be constant: Ct+1
Ct
= γC ,
Et+1
Et
= γE,
Kt+1
Kt
= γK , and
gt+1
gt
= γg for all t.
Assuming u(·) = log(·) and v(·) = log(·), the balanced growth path can be found analyt-
ically.
Proposition 4 Given initial private and public capital stocks, K0 and g0, the Balanced
Growth Path is characterized by the following:
• C
K
= (1− β)[1− δg + Aα( g
K
)α−1]
• E
K
= A(
g
K
)α − ( 1
β
+
g
K
)β[1− δg + Aα( g
K
)α−1] + (1− δk) + (1− δg) g
K
• τ = 1− [1− δg + Aα(
g
K
)α−1]− (1− δk)
A( g
K
)α
• γC = γK = γE = γg = γ ≡ β[1− δg + Aα( g
K
)α−1]
where g
K
satisfies:
(1−θ){A( g
K
)α−( 1
β
+
g
K
)β[1−δg+Aα( g
K
)α−1]+(1−δk)+(1−δg) g
K
}−θ(1−β)[1−δg+Aα( g
K
)α−1] =
θβ[δk − δg + Aα( g
K
)α−1 − A(1− α)( g
K
)α]
5For the dynamic analysis of an endogenous growth model with public capital, see Futagami, Morita,
and Shibata (1993).
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Proof. See Appendix A.
The key ratio for the balanced growth path is the public-to-private capital ratio, g
K
; all
other variables are determined according to this ratio. Notice that this ratio depends on a
number of things, including depreciation rates of public capital and private capital (δg and
δk), rate of time preference of consumers and the government (β), public capital elasticity of
output (α), and the type of the government (θ). Moreover it is shown that on the balanced
growth path all variables grow at the same rate and hence the consumption-private capital
ratio and the expropriation-private capital ratio stay constant.
Proposition 5 As the public-to-private capital ratio g
K
increases growth rate decreases.
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Figure 1: Growth and gK . Parameter values are A =
1
3 , α = 0.25, β = 0.9, and δk = δg = 0.07.
This result might seem counter-intuitive at first. After all, public investment provides
infrastructure to private capital, so that private investment is more productive. One would
expect to see beneficial effects of public investment. The effect of public capital in competitive
equilibrium is indeed a positive one. In a competitive equilibrium, growth rate would be given
by:
γCE = β[1− δk + (1− τ)A( g
K
)α] (11)
So, in a competitive equilibrium, the higher g
K
is, the higher the growth rate. Note that,
in a competitive equilibrium, taxes are taken as given. In Ramsey equilibrium, however,
taxes are not constant and they depend on g
K
. The more public capital provided, the higher
the taxes. While higher public capital is beneficial for economic growth, higher taxes have
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the opposite effect. Proposition 5 implies that in Ramsey equilibrium, the increase in τ more
than offsets the increase in g
K
, and the growth rate decreases as a result.
Case 1 (Full Depreciation) Assume δg = δk = 1.
In this case the equation determining g
K
simplifies significantly:
g
K
=
α
(1− θ)(1− β) + β(1− α) (12)
Proposition 6 A self-interested government sets a higher public-to-private capital ratio than
a benevolent government does, for all β < 1.
From the above expression for g
K
, if the government is benevolent, i.e. θ = 0, it chooses:
(
g
K
)BEN =
α
(1− βα) (13)
If the government is self-interested, i.e. θ = 1, it chooses:
(
g
K
)SELF−INT =
α
β(1− α) (14)
Proposition 6 is one of the most important results of the paper, and as such, it re-
quires an intuitive explanation as to why a self-interested government would choose a higher
public-to-private capital ratio compared to a benevolent one. A close look at the production
function shows that public capital always increases the amount of production; however, the
effect of public capital on production depends on the public-to-private capital ratio. If the
productivity of public capital is high, then the government has more incentives to invest
than to embezzle the funds. Therefore, a self-interested government, which would like to
enjoy the expropriated funds would rather have the productivity of public capital low. Since
public capital is more productive when the public-to-private capital ratio is low, by setting
that ratio inefficiently high allows the government to use more of the tax revenues for its
own consumption rather than for public investment. This explanation is consistent with
the empirical work of Tanzi and Davoodi (1997), who assert that corruption reduces the
productivity of public capital.
Note that many endogenous growth models with public investment, starting with Barro
(1990), find the optimal public investment-to-private capital ratio to be equal to the ratio
of output elasticities of the two inputs, i.e. α
1−α . However, in the case of a benevolent
government in this model, the optimal choice of the government is lower than that ratio as
can be seen in equation (13). This is because in this model, unlike Barro (1990) and others,
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public investment is taken as a stock variable rather than a flow variable and the government
policy involves choosing next period’s capital level rather than current investment. Hence,
Barro (1990)’s golden rule is discounted by the rate of time preference of the government and
consumers. As long as the consumers are at least as patient as the government, the optimal
g
K
in this model is smaller than α
1−α . Impatience of consumers implies that a high public-
to-private capital ratio is not desirable when public investment is financed by distortionary
income taxes.
Proposition 7 (Government Policy) When public and private capital fully depreciate
(a) all types of governments set the same productive public investment share of output.
(b) total public investment increases as a government gets less benevolent.
(c) tax rate increases as a government gets less benevolent.
First consider productive public investment as a share of income. Given that there is full
depreciation of productive public capital, this share is equal to gt+1
Yt
. Moreover, gt+1 = γ · gt.
Hence, by simple algebra:
gt+1
Yt
=
ig
Y
= βα (15)
Notice that this value does not depend on θ, so all types of governments choose the same
share of public investment.
So, in countries with high g
K
, i.e. countries with self-interested governments, the pro-
ductive private investment share is smaller than in countries with benevolent governments.
Total public investment, on the other hand, does depend on the type of the government and
it can easily seen that
∂( ig+E
Y
)
∂θ
> 0.
ig + E
Y
= βα + θ(1− β) (16)
Now consider the tax rate:
τ = βα + θ(1− β) (17)
When the government is benevolent (θ = 0):
τBEN = βα (18)
When the government is totally self-interested, (θ = 1):
τSELF−INT = 1− β + βα (19)
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Notice that when the government is totally benevolent all of the tax revenues are used
for financing the productive public investment. A self-interested government uses only part
of the tax revenues for productive public investment and provides the same amount of
productive public investment. The government engages in more non-productive activities
as it becomes less patient, i.e.
∂(E
Y
)
∂β
< 0.
Proposition 8 When public and private capital fully depreciate (δk = δg = 0):
(a) private investment decreases as a government gets less benevolent.
(b) growth rate of the economy decreases as a government gets less benevolent.
Share of private investment in total output can be calculated as below. Note that as θ
decreases, ik
Y
decreases.
kt+1
Yt
=
ik
Y
= β[(1− θ)(1− β) + β(1− α)] (20)
Growth rate is given by:
γ = Aβαα[(1− θ)(1− β) + β(1− α)]1−α (21)
It is easy to show that the growth rate increases with θ. This is consistent with the
results that private investment and productive public investment increase with θ.
Case 2 (Less Than Full Depreciation) Assume 0 < δg < 1, 0 < δk < 1.
In this case there is no way to simplify the formulas presented above. However, it is
still possible to see how a benevolent government differs from a self-interested one. Table
1 shows public investment share of output, private investment share of output, public-to-
private capital ratio, and growth rate corresponding to different degrees of benevolence.
These figures are calculated for A = 1
3
, β = 0.9, α = 0.25, δk = 0.07, and δg = 0.07.
Public investment share of output is again roughly the same across different types of
government but private investment share is much higher in countries with benevolent gov-
ernments. Growth rate is also higher in these countries while tax rate is lower.
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Table 1: Balanced Growth Path Values
θ 0 0.10 0.25 0.50
g/K 0.28 0.30 0.33 0.40
g/Y 1.17 1.22 1.32 1.52
K/Y 4.12 4.05 3.95 3.77
ig/Y 0.12 0.11 0.10 0.08
E/Y 0 0.06 0.15 0.30
τ 0.12 0.18 0.25 0.38
ik/Y 0.41 0.37 0.31 0.21
Growth Rate 3% 2.1% 1% -1.5%
3 Empirical Implications of the Model
The theory has implications about the total public investment and economic growth. A
self-interested government chooses a high level of public investment, and the increased taxes
to finance that investment causes the private investment to fall, hence the low growth rate.
If countries are lined up according to their total public investments, the model predicts that
those would high levels of public investment would have low growth rates.
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Figure 2: Total Public Investment and Growth. Parameter values are A = 13 , α = 0.25, β = 0.9,
δk = δg = 0.07.
Another implication of the model is that the total public-to-private investment ratio is
inversely related to the growth rate. Figure 3 depicts the relationship of public-to-private
investment ratio and economic growth implied by the model.
The model also implies that productive public investment and expropriated tax revenues
are inversely correlated (see Figure 4). A benevolent government would choose a high pro-
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Figure 3: Total Public-to-private Investment Ratio and Growth. Parameter values same as in Figure 2.
ductive public investment share of output and would not embezzle resources for its own use.
A self-interested government, on the other hand, would choose a lower productive public
investment and use a large part of tax revenues for non-productive purposes. This means
that if the total public investment observed is high, then it is likely that most of this public
investment is non-productive, aimed at providing private returns for politicians. Figure 5
depicts this relationship.
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Figure 4: Productive Public Investment and Expro-
priated Resources as a Share of Output. Parameter
values same as in Figure 2.
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Figure 5: Total Public Investment Share of Output
and Expropriated Resources as a Share of Output. Pa-
rameter values same as in Figure 2.
Moreover, according to the model, private investment is lower in countries with self-
interested governments, while total public investment is higher. As a result, the public-to-
private investment ratio in corrupt countries is higher (see Figure 6). This is consistent with
the findings of Tanzi and Davoodi (1997), Mauro (1995) and Mauro (1995). Mauro (1995)
finds that corruption decreases private investment, while Tanzi and Davoodi (1997) maintain
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that corruption increases public investment.
Finally, the model predicts that economic growth would be lower in countries with high
corruption. This is also consistent with empirical work pioneered by Mauro (1995).
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Figure 6: Expropriated Resources and Total Public-to-private Investment Ratio. Parameter values same
as in Figure 2.
While there is empirical evidence supporting the implications of the model regarding
share of public investment, corruption, and growth, there are no studies examining how the
public-to-private capital ratio differs across countries. In the next section I present data and
compare it with the implications of the model regarding public-to-private capital.
4 Data
I took the public investment and private investment data from Easterly and Rebelo
(1993) data set.6 This data is gathered from sources including World Bank country reports,
United Nations’ national accounts data, and the World Bank’s annual World Development
Report. It includes more than 100 countries for 1970 through 1988. The authors calculate
private investment by subtracting public investment from total investment. However their
data set lacks private investment figures for many advanced countries. I used OECD data
to complement the Easterly-Rebelo data set and I calculated decade averages of public and
private investment in 1980s as a fraction of GDP.
6Finding reliable public investment data for a variety of countries is a more difficult task than one can
imagine. That is why I am using this relatively old data set.
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Public capital stock and private capital stock data are not readily available. As a proxy
for these variables, I used public investment and private investment data obtained from the
(extended) Easterly-Rebelo data set. Note that as long as public capital and private capital
depreciate at the same rate, the ratio of the two capitals g
K
would equal to the ratio of the
investments
ig
ik
. Therefore, using investment ratio rather than capital ratio would be a good
proxy if the two capitals depreciate at similar rates.
I took the growth rates from Heston, Summers, and Aten (2006) and I calculated the
average growth rate of real GDP per capita in year 2000 constant prices for 1980-1990.
The measure of corruption is obtained from Transparency International’s Corruption
Perceptions Index (CPI) for 2006. The CPI ranks countries by their perceived levels of
public sector corruption, as determined by expert assessments and opinion surveys. It scores
countries on a scale from zero to ten, with ten indicating a highly clean country and zero
indicating a highly corrupt country. Note that the CPI values are from 2006 whereas other
data are for 1980-1990. There is no CPI for that decade as the earliest CPI is collected in
1995. However, there is persistence in this index; countries that are corrupt in 1995 seem to
stay corrupt in 2006. The correlation coefficient for 1995 CPI and 2006 CPI for countries
that are reported in both is 0.93. See Appendix B for details. Hence, 2006 CPI would be a
good enough measure for perceived corruption in 1980s.
There are 86 countries in the whole sample and the complete list of countries included is
in Appendix B. Table 2 presents descriptive statistics of the variables analyzed.
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(b) Countries with X ≤ 5
Figure 7: Public-to-private Investment Ratio and Growth in the data.
Figure 7a shows the relationship between the public-to-private investment ratio and the
growth rate. The correlation coefficient is -0.23, which is significantly different than 0. Note
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Table 2: Descriptive Statistics
Mean Std. Dev. Minimum Maximum
Whole Sample (86 Countries)
Public Investment Share 0.10 0.05 0.02 0.27
Private Investment Share 0.11 0.06 0.005 0.29
Public-to-private Capital Ratio 1.72 2.90 0.11 16.24
Growth Rate (%) 1.22 2.25 -3.56 8.00
Corruption Perceptions Index 3.92 2.08 1.80 9.60
Advanced Countriesa (14 Countries)
Public Investment Share 0.05 0.03 0.02 0.13
Private Investment Share 0.20 0.08 0.12 0.29
Public-to-private Capital Ratio 0.26 0.21 0.11 0.84
Growth Rate (%) 2.94 2.02 0.20 6.41
Corruption Perceptions Index 7.69 1.83 4.40 9.60
Developing Countriesa (72 Countries)
Public Investment Share 0.11 0.05 0.04 0.27
Private Investment Share 0.10 0.06 0.005 0.25
Public-to-private Capital Ratio 2.00 3.05 0.30 16.24
Growth Rate (%) 0.88 2.15 -3.56 8.00
Corruption Perceptions Index 3.18 1.12 1.80 7.30
Least Corrupt Countriesb (11 Countries)
Public Investment Share 0.04 0.03 0.02 0.13
Private Investment Share 0.22 0.10 0.10 0.29
Public-to-private Capital Ratio 0.22 0.16 0.11 0.62
Growth Rate (%) 2.49 1.46 0.95 5.38
Corruption Perceptions Index 8.60 0.78 7.30 9.60
Most Corrupt Countriesb (10 Countries)
Public Investment Share 0.08 0.03 0.05 0.13
Private Investment Share 0.08 0.03 0.04 0.12
Public-to-private Capital Ratio 1.37 1.00 0.58 3.62
Growth Rate (%) -0.26 1.91 -3.56 3.93
Corruption Perceptions Index 2.07 0.14 1.80 2.20
aAccording to the classification of the IMF. See Appendix B for the list
of advanced countries.
bTop and bottom 10 countries according to the Corruption Perceptions
Index (2006). See Appendix B for the list of these countries.
that the correlation is not driven by the extreme points. If we take out countries7 whose
public-to-private investment ratio is higher than 5 the correlation coefficient decreases to
-0.29. This case is shown in Figure 7b. While there is more dispersion of growth rates at
low levels of public-to-private investment ratio, the growth rate is never too high when the
7These countries are Ethiopia, Hungary, Mauritania, Jamaica, Burundi, Mozambique, Poland, and Niger.
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investment ratio is high. The dispersion of growth rates at low levels can be explained by
this theory through changes across countries in public capital elasticity of output (α), rate
of time preference of the government β, and that of consumers. The model predicts, keeping
the type of the government constant, a higher public capital elasticity of output, a more
patient government, and less patient consumers result in higher investment ratios.
As Figure 8a shows, corruption and the public-to-private investment ratio are positively
related. (Recall that high numbers in the Corruption Perceptions Index refer to low cor-
ruption.) The correlation coefficient between the public-to-private capital ratio and the
Corruption Perceptions Index is -0.24 and it is significantly different than 0. Again, extreme
points do not drive this relationship. If we take out countries whose public-to-private in-
vestment ratios are above 5, the correlation coefficient would decrease to -0.43. This case is
shown in Figure 8b. This result is one of the main points made in this paper. Several authors
have maintained that corruption causes public investment as a share of output or of total
investment to be high (e.g. Tanzi and Davoodi (1997) and Keefer and Knack (2007)). What
is shown here is that with high corruption, public capital per private capital is too high.
Self-interested governments distort the capital mix and reduce the productivity of private
capital.
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Figure 8: Corruption and Public-to-private Investment Ratio in the data.
Figure 9 depicts the relationship between Corruption Perceptions Index and Public In-
vestment Share of Output. The correlation coefficient is -0.33 and it is statistically signif-
icant. This is in line with the model’s results. Corrupt governments inflate the amount of
public investment by reducing the productive public investment and increasing the amount
of funds expropriated. Keefer and Knack (2007) find a similar result and claim that public
investment reported should not be used for policy suggestions because the reported public
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investment data is an overestimation of the actual productive public investment.
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Figure 9: Corruption and Public Inv. in the data.
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Figure 10: Corruption and Growth in the data.
Finally, Figure 10 demonstrates the relationship between corruption and growth. The
correlation coefficient is 0.43 and it is significantly different than 0. This concurs not only
the implication of the model but also what other scholars have argued (see Mauro (1995),
Tanzi and Davoodi (1997)).
Table 3 summarizes the correlation coefficients for all the variables. Recall that countries
with high CPI values are relatively clean economies. Hence, a negative correlation of a
variable with CPI means that variable is high in corrupt countries. Note that all coefficients
are statistically significant except for the ones noted in the table.
Table 3: Correlation Coefficients
g/K g/K Growth
(ig + E)/Y ik/Y (all) (≤ 5) Rate CPI
(ig + E)/Y 1
ik/Y -0.11∗ 1
g/K (all) 0.45 -0.58 1
g/K(≤ 5) 0.59 -0.58 - 1
Growth Rate 0.16∗ 0.55 -0.23 -0.29 1
CPI -0.33 0.51 -0.24 -0.43 0.43 1
∗Not statistically significant.
5 Concluding remarks
In many macroeconomic models that deal with government choices, the government is
assumed to be benevolent. When the government is totally benevolent one would not expect
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to see political corruption in the economy. In this paper the assumption of a benevolent
government is relaxed and a simple model that tries to explain the interaction between
political corruption, public investment, and economic growth is developed. In line with
many other studies, one result of the model is that corruption is detrimental to economic
growth. A self-interested government chooses a high productive public-to-private capital
ratio, thereby increasing the returns to private capital. However, this increase in the capital
ratio requires the tax rates to go up, causing the after-tax returns to be lower. The net effect
on growth is negative. Also, part of the tax revenues are expropriated by the government,
so the share of output that goes to productive public investment in corrupt countries is low.
An interesting extension of the model would be to consider the case when the govern-
ment does not have access to a commitment technology and compare the result to those of
Azzimonti-Renzo, Sarte, and Soares (2003).
In this model the type of government is taken as given and the reasons as to why some
governments are more self-interested than others are not explored. The type of government
in any country might depend on the historical, cultural, institutional, and macroeconomic
environment in that country. My aim for future research is to explore the macroeconomic
determinants of corruption.
Appendix A - Proofs of Propositions
Proof of Proposition 1
The first constraint, the feasibility constraint, is part of the definition of CE. The second
one is obtained by plugging GBC, Price, and Feasibility in Cons-FOC.
u′(Ct) = βu′(Ct+1)[(1− (Et+1 + gt+2 − (1− δg)gt+1
rr+1Kt+1
))rt+1 + 1− δk]
u′(Ct) = βu′(Ct+1)[A(
gt+1
Kt+1
)α − (Et+1 + gt+2 − (1− δg)gt+1
A( gt+1
Kt+1
)αKt+1
)A(
gt+1
Kt+1
)α + 1− δk]
u′(Ct) = βu′(Ct+1)[
A( gt+1
Kt+1
)αKt+1 − Et+1 − gt+2 + (1− δg)gt+1
Kt+1
+ 1− δk]
u′(Ct) = βu′(Ct+1)[
Ct+1 +Kt+2 − (1− δk)Kt+1
Kt+1
+ 1− δk]
u′(Ct) = βu′(Ct+1)[
Ct+1 +Kt+2
Kt+1
]
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Proof of Proposition 2
Aggregate allocations {Ct, Kt}t≥0, initial conditions g0 and K0, and first-period policies g1,
τ0 and E0 are given. Prices {rt}∞t=0 and policies {τt, Et, gt+1}∞t=1 need to be constructed. To
this end first-order conditions will be used. Given the assumptions on the utility function
of consumers, the first-order conditions are both necessary and sufficient for consumer and
firm maximization.
The following four equations can be used to construct rt, τt, Et, and gt+1 at each
time t:
rt = A
(
gt
Kt
)α
(22)
τt+1 = 1−
[
u′t
βu′t+1
− 1 + δk
]
1
A
(
gt+1
kt+1
)α (23)
Ct +Kt+1 − (1− δk)Kt + gt+1 − (1− δg)gt + Et = AKt
(
gt
Kt
)α
(24)
gt+1 − (1− δg)gt + Et = A(1− τt)Kt
(
gt
Kt
)α
(25)
Proof of Proposition 4
As shown in the main discussion, Ramsey Problem is characterized by the following equa-
tions:
(1− θ)
Ct
+ λt − µt
C2t
+
µt−1
C2t
[
Ct +Kt+1
Kt
]− µt−1
CtKt
= 0 (26)
λt − βλt+1[1− δk +A(1− α)
(
gt+1
Kt+1
)α
] + β
µt
Ct+1
[
Ct+1 +Kt+2
K2t+1
]− µt−1Kt
Ct
= 0 (27)
θ
Et
+ λt = 0 (28)
λt − βλt+1[1− δg +Aα
(
gt+1
Kt+1
)α−1
] = 0 (29)
Ct +Kt+1 − (1− δk)Kt + gt+1 − (1− δg)gt + Et = AKt
(
gt
Kt
)α
(30)
β
Ct+1
[
Ct+1 +Kt+2
Kt+1
] =
1
Ct
(31)
On a balanced growth path, the following ratios must be constant: Ct+1
Ct
= γC ,
Et+1
Et
= γE,
Kt+1
Kt
= γK , and
gt+1
gt
= γg for all t.
Plug (28) in (29):
Et+1
Et
= β[1− δg + Aα
(
gt+1
Kt+1
)α−1
]
In order for this ratio to be constant over time, gt
Kt
must be constant for all t. Denote this
ratio by X = g
K
. Then:
γE = β[1− δg + AαXα−1]
Equation (31) on balanced growth path implies:
24
Ct
Kt
+ γK =
γC
β
So Ct
Kt
is a constant for all t, hence γC = γK . So, on balanced growth path:
C
K
= (
1− β
β
)γK (32)
Rewrite equation (30):
Ct
Kt
+
Kt+1
Kt
− (1− δk) + gt+1
Kt
− (1− δg) gt
Kt
+
Et
Kt
= A
(
gt
Kt
)α
On balanced growth path:
(
1− β
β
)γK + γK − (1− δk) +XγK − (1− δg)X + Et
Kt
= AXα
So, Et
Kt
is a constant for all t; hence γE = γK and:
E
K
= AXα − ( 1
β
+X)γK + (1− δk) + (1− δg)X (33)
Now consider (26). Plug (28) in (26):
(1− θ)
Ct
− θ
Et
− µt
C2t
+
µt−1
C2t
[
Ct +Kt+1
Kt
]− µt−1
Ct
1
Kt
= 0
Multiply it by Kt and consider the balanced growth path:
(1− θ)K
C
− θK
E
− µtK
CtC
+
µt−1K
CtC
[
Ct +Kt+1
Kt
]− µt−1
Ct
= 0
Rewrite it:
(1− θ)K
C
− (1− γ)K
E
− µt
Ct
K
C
+
µt−1
Ct−1
(
K
γKC
[
C
K
+ γK ]− 1
γK
)
= 0 (34)
Now consider (27). Plug (28) and (29) in (27):
−
(
γK − β(1− δk) + Aβ(1− α)
(
gt+1
Kt+1
)α)
θ
Et+1
+
µtβ
Ct+1
[
Ct+1 +Kt+2
K2t+1
]− µt−1 1
CtKt
= 0
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Multiply by Kt+1 and consider the balanced growth path:
− (γK − β(1− δk) + Aβ(1− α)Xα)) θK
E
+
µtβ
γKCt
[
C
K
+ γK ]− µt−1 γK
γKCt−1
= 0
Rewrite it:
− (γK − β(1− δk) + Aβ(1− α)Xα) θK
E
+
µt
Ct
β
γK
[
C
K
+ γK ]− µt−1
Ct−1
= 0 (35)
(34) and (35) are difference equations for µ
C
. They have to be satisfied at the same time.
Hence, this condition can be used to find X. The X that satisfies both (34) and (35) is given
by:
(1−θ)K
C
− θK
E
K
C
= β
(
[1− δg + AαXα−1]− [1− δk + A(1− α)Xα]
)
θ
K
E
(36)
Once C
K
and E
K
are substituted from equations (32) and (33), one can solve for X using (36).
Now consider the Euler equation from the consumer’s problem:
Ct+1
Ct
= β[(1− τt+1)rt+1 + 1− δk]
From the government’s problem:
Ct+1
Ct
= β[1− δg + AαXα−1]
Equating the two:
τ = 1− 1− δg + AαX
α−1 − (1− δk)
AXα
Then the balanced growth path is characterized as follows:
• C
K
= (1− β)[1− δg + AαXα−1]
• E
K
= AXα − ( 1
β
+X)β[1− δg + AαXα−1] + (1− δk) + (1− δg)X
• g
K
= X
• τ = 1− 1−δg+AαXα−1−(1−δk)
AXα
• γC = γK = γE = γg = β[1− δg + AαXα−1]
where X satisfies:
(1−θ){AXα−( 1
β
+X)β[1−δg+AαXα−1]+(1−δk)+(1−δg)X
}−θ(1−β)[1−δg+AαXα−1] =
26
θβ[δk − δg + AαXα−1 − A(1− α)Xα]
Appendix B - Data
List of countries included in the sample
Algeria, Argentina, Australia, Austria, Bangladesh, Belize, Benin, Bolivia, Botswana, Brazil,
Burkina Faso, Burundi, Cameroon, Canada, Central African Republic, Chile, China, Colom-
bia, Costa Rica, Coˆte d’Ivoire, Dominica, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Egypt, El Sal-
vador, Equatorial Guinea, Ethiopia, Finland, Gabon, Ghana, Greece, Grenada, Guinea,
Haiti, Honduras, Hong Kong, Hungary, India, Indonesia, Italy, Jamaica, Kenya, South
Korea, Lesotho, Malawi, Malaysia, Mali, Malta, Mauritania, Mauritius, Mexico, Morocco,
Mozambique, Nepal, Netherlands, New Zealand, Niger, Nigeria, Pakistan, Panama, Papua
New Guinea, Paraguay, Peru, Philippines, Poland, Rwanda, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Singa-
pore, South Africa, Sri Lanka, Sudan, Suriname, Swaziland, Syria, Taiwan, Thailand, Togo,
Tunisia, Turkey, UK, Uruguay, USA, Venezuela, Zambia, and Zimbabwe.
Advanced countries included in the sample
Australia, Austria, Canada, Finland, Greece, Hong Kong, Italy, Netherlands, New Zealand,
Singapore, South Korea, Taiwan, UK, and USA.
Least corrupt countries included in the sample
Australia, Austria, Canada, Chile, Finland, Hong Kong, Netherlands, New Zealand, Singa-
pore, UK, and USA.
Most corrupt countries included in the sample
Bangladesh, Coˆte d’Ivoire, Equatorial Guinea, Guinea, Haiti, Kenya, Nigeria, Pakistan,
Sierra Leone, and Sudan.
Corruption Perceptions Index in 1995 and 2006
Only 30 countries in the sample have CPI values in 1995. These countries are Argentina,
Australia, Austria, Brazil, Canada, Chile, China, Colombia, Finland, Greece, Hong Kong,
Hungary, India, Indonesia, Italy, Malaysia, Mexico, Netherlands, New Zealand, Pakistan,
Philippines, Singapore, South Africa, South Korea, Taiwan, Thailand, Turkey, UK, USA,
and Venezuela. The correlation coefficient between 1995 CPI values and 2006 CPI values for
these countries is 0.93.
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